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Abstract:  
 
When an innovative product is introduced into the market, consumers are often uncertain about 
the product value. Over time they may learn the value of product. This paper studies the impact 
of consumer learning on the firms' marketing efforts and revenue sharing strategies in a supply 
chain that sells an innovative product to consumers over multiple periods. Both the supplier and 
the retailer can exert marketing efforts to influence consumers' beliefs about the product and 
improve the product demand. Because the supplier and the retailer are independent entities with 
self-interested objectives, double moral hazard exists in the supply chain. We find that the 
supplier and retailer exert more marketing efforts in the presence of consumer learning but the 
marketing efforts decrease as consumers learn more about the product. We also examine the 
revenue-sharing strategies and find that supplier shares more revenue to the retailer when they 
cooperate for a longer time horizon. The total profit of the supply chain may be higher when 
there is information asymmetry between the supplier and retailer. This finding suggests that 
information sharing is not always beneficial to improve supply chain coordination. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Valuation uncertainty often arises when innovative products are introduced into the consumer 
market. The consumers, without experiencing the innovative products, can rarely predict with 
certain- ty the values of the products [19]. For example, when a new hybrid car is launched, a 
consumer might not be able to predict its fuel efficiency and battery life. When a new game 
console is released, a consumer might not be able to anticipate precisely the diversity and 
amusement of the games compatible with the console. Other newly innovated electronic 
products, such as smart phones and tablet computers, have similar issues. This scenario is also 
prevalent in agribusiness, software, and apparel industries. 
 
Over time consumers may obtain more information about a product from multiple sources and 
evaluate the product better [23]. For example, the consumers can view professional product 
reviews from magazines or peer consumer reviews published online [8,12]. They can also learn 
the historical sales prices and sales numbers of products via e-commerce websites or through 
companies' earnings releases. For example, eBay posts the past transaction records of listing 
items on its listing page; Apple's earnings report disclosed the sales numbers of its flagship 
products—17.07 million iPhones and 11.12 million iPads during the last quarter of 2011 [1]. 
Compared with professional and consumer product reviews, product sales numbers are more 
difficult to be manipulated and hence convey more reliable information about the product. In this 
paper, we focus on consumer learning through product sales. 
 
Firms in a supply chain often exert marketing efforts to change their consumers' perceptions of 
the product values. Purchasing television or online advertisements, hiring public relationship 
companies to publish positive product articles in magazines, and/or offering various promotional 
incentives such as gift with purchase and next purchase discount are some of the mechanisms by 
which firms attempt to influence consumer perceptions. It has been recognized that marketing 
activities in the supply chain often generate positive externalities [14]. As one firm's marketing 
effort improves the brand image and boosts the product demand, all firms participating in the 
supply chain may benefit. However, in most practical situations, the full scope of the firm's 
actions (including marketing efforts) is not observable by other firms in the supply chain. The 
firm may avoid spending on the costly (and sometimes unobservable) marketing effort be- cause 
it would not like to share the resultant benefit with its supply chain partners. This is how double 
moral hazard arises [2,15]. 
 
In this paper, we consider a supply chain with consumer learning and double moral hazard. The 
supply chain consists of supplier, retailer, consumer and has the following features. First, the 
consumers are uncertain about the true value of the innovative product. Over time, the consumers 
may learn more about the product value from prior sales of the product. In particular, higher 
product sales signal a higher product value to the consumers, which yields a higher product 
demand. Second, the firms (both the supplier and retailer) in the supply chain can exert 
marketing efforts to change the product sales. Finally, a firm's marketing effort is unobservable 
by any other firm or consumers in the supply chain. This leads to the issue of double moral 
hazard. 
 
This paper aims to explore the impact of consumer learning on the firms' marketing strategies 
and supply chain coordination in the presence of double moral hazard. In particular, this paper 
answers the following questions. First, when the consumers are uncertain about the true value of 
a new product and learn the product value from prior sales, how do the supplier and retailer exert 
marketing efforts to improve the product demand? Do the marketing efforts increase or decrease 
over a period of time? Compared with the case without consumer learning, do the firms exert 
more or less marketing efforts? The answers to these questions provide important implications 
on understanding the firms' marketing strategies. 
 
The second issue concerns the impact of consumer learning on sup- ply chain coordination. We 
consider a linear revenue-sharing scheme in which the supplier decides the revenue sharing ratio. 
There are several questions that need to be addressed. How do the firms share the revenue in the 
supply chain in the presence of consumer learning? Is the supplier willing to share more or less 
revenue with the retailer when the two entities cooperate over a longer time horizon? Compared 
with the case without consumer learning, does the supplier share more or less revenue with the 
retailer? The answers to these questions help us gain greater insight on supply chain coordination 
for innovative products. 
 
The third and last issue relates to the role of information in the supply chain with consumer 
learning and double moral hazard. Conventional wisdom suggests that information asymmetry 
undermines supply chain coordination and firms therefore strive to eliminate in- formation 
asymmetry. With consumer learning, does double moral hazard still undermine the profit of the 
supply chain? Should the sup- ply chain always eliminate information asymmetry between the 
trade partners? A better understanding of the role of information enables the entities in the 
supply chain to improve the management of information in the supply chain. 
 
Our research results depict several interesting findings. We find that the supplier and retailer 
exert more marketing efforts to increase the product demand in the case with consumer learning 
compared with that without consumer learning. This result holds even though the consumers 
always correctly predict the firms' demand-boosting strategies and adjust their beliefs. Over time, 
consumers learn more and predict the product value more accurately. As a result, firms exert less 
marketing efforts because the efforts have less impact on the consumers' perception. 
 
The revenue sharing ratio is higher when the entities in the supply chain cooperate over a longer 
time horizon. A higher revenue sharing ratio decreases the supplier's incentive to exert effort 
whereas consumer learning negates this effect. Compared with the case without consumer 
learning, the supplier shares more revenue to motivate the retailer to increase the latter's effort. 
With a longer time horizon, the impact of consumer learning on the supplier's marketing effort is 
stronger, leading to a higher revenue sharing ratio. 
 
This paper also has a counterintuitive finding about the role of in- formation. The results show 
that the total profit of the entities in the supply chain may be higher when there is asymmetric 
information between the supplier and the retailer. This stands in contrast to the findings in the 
existing literature that double moral hazard under- mines the total profit of firms. With double 
moral hazard, the firms in the supply chain tend to exert less effort because the benefit will be 
split amongst the partners. In this paper, we find that consumer learning motivates firms to exert 
higher marketing efforts. This positive effect of consumer learning mitigates the adverse 
consequences of double moral hazard. When the supplier has complete information and thereby 
decides the marketing efforts for all the entities in the supply chain, the supplier demands too 
much marketing efforts for the purpose of misleading consumers. Therefore, better information 
in the supply chain does not always improve the profit of the supply chain. Double moral hazard 
may be beneficial in presence of consumer learning. This is one of the major findings of this 
research. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 outlines the 
model. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the cases without consumer learning and with consumer 
learning respectively. Section 6 compares the results in different cases and conclusions are 
presented in the last section of the paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
This paper draws upon and contributes to several streams of literature as reviewed in this section. 
First, this paper relates to the literature on moral hazard. There is a large body of literature 
examining the issue of moral hazard in supply chains [4,6,7]. These studies only consider the 
agency issues on the retailer side. In many practical situations, both the suppliers and retailers 
can invest in costly efforts to improve the performance of the supply chains. In this paper, we 
consider both parties' efforts which comes down to a double moral hazard problem. 
 
Double moral hazard has also been examined in the literature. Holmstrom examines moral 
hazard in team (partnership) and shows that any sharing rule subject to the budget balancing 
constraint cannot achieve the first-best outcome in team production [13]. Corbett and Decroix 
consider a supply chain where the consumption of indirect materials is endogenously determined 
by both the supplier's and the retailer's efforts [5]. The supplier and retailer have countervailing 
incentives to exert consumption–reduction efforts as the retailer saves but the supplier loses from 
a reduced consumption. They find that a simple shared- savings contract is possible to increase 
channel profits. Lal studies the royalty structure and the monitoring technology of revenue 
sharing con- tracts in a franchising setting [16]. He finds that a contract with royalty fee can 
provide appropriate incentives to both the franchisor and the franchisee. Bhattacharyya and 
Lafontaine model a principal and agent problem with double moral hazard [2]. They show that a 
simple linear contract in which the principal and the agent share the output in addition to a fixed 
monetary transfer yields the second-best outcome (complete information results in the first-best 
outcome). Eswaran and Kotwal investigate the use of revenue-sharing contract in the presence of 
double moral hazard [9]. They find that a revenue sharing contract is advantageous when the 
class structure is polarized—the landlord lacks production capability and the tenants have little 
management capability. The current paper contributes to this stream of literature by investigating 
double moral hazard in the presence of consumer learning. 
 
This paper also relates to the literature on supply chain coordination with strategic consumers, 
who decide on the timing of purchase. Su and Zhang study a newsvendor problem with forward-
looking consumers who can rationally anticipate future product sales and availability [22]. They 
find that the seller's stocking level is lower in the case with strategic consumers as opposed to the 
case with nonstrategic consumers and a decentralized supply chain yields a higher profit. 
Swinney investigates the value of quick response production for a firm selling to a forward-
looking consumer population [23]. The consumers are uncertain about their valuations for the 
product at the start of the selling sea- son but learn their valuations upon receiving private signals 
later. Swinney finds that the quick response strategy does not always improve the firm's profit 
with strategic consumers [23]. 
 
Recently a number of papers consider consumer learning using multi-period models. Gallego, et 
al. investigate a firm's optimal pricing policy when the firm's markup policy in the current season 
changes the consumers' expectation and purchasing behaviors in future seasons [10]. Gallego et 
al. find that a single-price policy is optimal if all consumers are strategic and demand is known to 
the seller [10]. Ovchinnikov and Milner numerically illustrate the value of offering end-of-period 
deals when consumers learn to expect the firm's discount policy and wait to buy [21]. They 
consider consumers with heterogeneous valuation on the product and different types of learning 
dynamics (self-regulating and smoothing function). Liu and van Ryzin study a capacity rationing 
problem with a supplier selling to consumers over repeated seasons [18]. Even though the 
consumers can observe the supplier's past capacity, they cannot anticipate product availability 
perfectly. The consumers form their expectations about product availability through a smoothing 
rule with an exogenous specified constant learning factor. Gaur and Park model the retailers' 
inventory decisions and analyze the competition taking account of asymmetric consumer 
learning [11]. The consumers up- date their beliefs on the service level by associating different 
weights with the positive and negative experiences. The previous papers explore the firms' 
(suppliers' and retailers') pricing, rationing and inventory decisions with consumer learning. Our 
paper focuses on the firms' marketing decisions in a supply chain with consumer learning. 
 
3. Model 
 
We model a supply chain with a supplier and a retailer marketing and selling an innovative 
product over multiple periods. We assume that both the supplier and the retailer are monopolists 
in the whole- sale and consumer markets respectively, as done by Su [22] and Swinney [23]. In 
each period, there is a constant flow of new consumers entering the consumer market. In many 
practical situations, potential consumers are uncertain about the true value of innovative product 
but they can learn the product value. A consumer's belief of product value is often affected by the 
behavior of the prior consumers. For example, the consumers can acquire more information from 
online professional or customer review [8,12]. In addition to product reviews, an important 
source for consumers to learn product values is product sales. Product sales reflect the collective 
behavior of past consumers. Compared to online reviews, the product sales is more difficult to be 
manipulated, and hence is more likely to carry trustworthy information about the true value of 
the product. In this paper, we focus on consumer learning through product sales.  
 
We assume that the price of the innovative product is fixed. Let it be p. Fixed prices for new 
products are often seen in the retailing sectors such as mobile phones (e.g., iPhones and HTC 
phones), computing devices (e.g., iPads and Motorola Xoom) and software applications 
(e.g., Auto CAD and Div X). The assumption of fixed price has been widely used in the 
literature on supply chain management [3,4,22]. We use θ to denote the consumer demand. In 
most practical situations, the higher the product value is, the more consumers are willing to buy 
the product. Therefore, θ can be considered as a proxy of the product value. For example, 
suppose that the utility of a consumer from purchasing and using the product is αV−p where V 
represents the value of the product and α characterizes a consumer's preference. The consume 
whose preference parameter is higher than p V will purchase this product. If α is uniformly 
distributed between 0 and 1, we have θ ¼ 1−p V. The consumer demand is an increasing 
function of the product value V. In this paper, our analysis focuses on θ. The demand, θ, is 
assumed to be a random variable with a distribution function F(.) and mean θ0. 
 
The supplier and the retailer can exert marketing efforts to embellish the product and manipulate 
the consumers' beliefs. For example, the supplier may conduct a national advertising campaign to 
promote the product functions and features or hire public relationship companies to publish 
positive articles at major journals to persuade consumers to buy. The retailer may offer various 
promotional incentives such as gift with purchase, next purchase discount, or other non-monetary 
incentives to boost the local demand. Let x and y be the supplier's and retailer's marketing efforts 
respectively. Cs (x) and Cr (y) are used to denote the supplier's and the retailer's cost functions 
respectively. It is assumed that both Cs (x) and Cr (y) are increasing and convex functions, 
i.e., C′s(x)>0, C″s(x)>0, C′r(y)>0 and C″r(y)>0. In addition, Cs(0)=0, C′s(0)=0, Cr(0)=0 and 
C′r(0)=0. These assumptions ensure the existence of unique interior solutions. In this paper, it is 
assumed that neither the supplier nor the retailer can observe the other party's marketing effort, 
which yields a double moral hazard problem in the supply chain [2]. The consumers cannot 
observe any marketing efforts. 
 
A direct consequence of successful marketing campaigns is higher market demand. We use d to 
denote the market demand of the product and assume that in period t, dt is dependent on θ 
(refereed to as the base demand in the rest of the paper), the supplier's marketing effort, xt, and 
the retailer's marketing effort, yt. In particular, 
 
 
 
where εt is a random error representing unobservable market fluctuations. We assume that εt is a 
random variable with the distribution function G(.) and mean 0. 
 
The supplier and the retailer have complete information on the number of products sold in the 
supply chain. As we discussed in the Introduction, the product sales are often public information 
in the consumer market. We therefore assume that the market demand dt is observable and 
verifiable. However no one observes the base demand θ (or the true product value V). Since the 
demand, dt, carries information about the base demand θ (or the product value V), potential 
consumers can learn the base demand (or the product value) through their observations of the 
market demands. Therefore, the market demand dt can be considered as a signal of the base 
demand θ. The consumers update their beliefs on the based demand θ (i.e., the product value V) 
based on their observations of market demands Dt={d1,..dt}. 
 
The sequence of events is as follows. At the beginning of the time horizon, θ is realized and then 
the supplier decides the revenue sharing ratio ϕ. The supplier and the retailer interact for multiple 
periods. At the beginning of period t=2,…,N, the consumers observe the product sales in the 
previous period, dt−1 and update their beliefs on the base demand (or product value). The 
supplier and the retailer then estimate the market demand taking account of consumer learning. 
The supplier and retailer decide their marketing efforts, xt and yt. At the end of period t, the 
demand, dt, is realized and the supplier keeps (1−ϕ)pdt of the revenue and the retailer obtains 
ϕpdt of the revenue. We assume everything is common knowledge except the true value of the 
product value θ, the market fluctuation ε, the supplier effort xt and the retailer's effort yt, 
t=1,…,N. 
 
4. No consumer learning 
 
We first consider the cases without consumer learning. When there is no consumer learning, the 
supplier and the retailer's marketing efforts only affect the product sales in the current periods. 
The supplier's (the retailer's) optimization problem is the same in each period. For ease of 
exposition, we drop the subscript t and focus on analyzing a one-period model in this section. We 
first consider the case where the supplier and the retailer have symmetric information and then 
the case where there is asymmetric information between the supplier and the retailer. In the rest 
of the paper, we use the superscript ij to denote the information structure of the supply chain. In 
particular, i∈{m,a} where m represents symmetric information and a represents asymmetric 
information; and j∈{n,l} where n represents no consumer learning and l represents consumer 
learning. 
 
4.1 Symmetric information without consumer learning 
 
In the case of symmetric information, the firms' marketing efforts are common knowledge, i.e., 
both firms' efforts are observable and verifiable to each other. The supplier and retailer can 
directly contract on the marketing efforts. We use Π to represent the supplier's profit and π to 
represent the retailer's profit. The superscript mn represents the case with symmetric information 
and no consumer learning. In the one-period model, the supplier's optimization problem can be 
represented by  
 
 
 
where (IR) is the retailer's individual rationality constraint which ensures that the retailer's profit 
is not less than its reservation utility. In this paper, we assume that the retailer's reservation 
utility is zero. In the case with symmetric information, the IR constraint is binding. We therefore 
have 
 
 
 
and the supplier chooses the marketing efforts which maximize the total profit 
 
 
 
Substitute Eq. (1) into (2) and apply E[θ]=θ0 and E[ε]=0, we have 
 
 
 
Using the first-order-conditions, the supplier and the retailer's efforts are given by 
 
 
 
When the supplier has complete information, the supplier can specify the retailer's marketing 
effort in the contract. ϕ is chosen to compensate the retailer's cost of marketing effort. There is no 
incentive cost under this situation. The supplier will choose the marketing efforts which 
maximize the total profit of the supply chain. The supplier extracts all the surplus and maximizes 
the total benefit. 
 
4.2 Asymmetric information without consumer learning 
 
In the case of asymmetric information, the marketing efforts are unobservable and the supplier 
and the retailer cannot directly contract on the marketing efforts. The supplier has to share the 
revenue to motivate the retailer to exert effort. We use the superscript an to represent the case 
with asymmetric information and no consumer learning. The supplier and retailer's optimization 
problems can be represented 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
The supplier and the retailer's marketing efforts are given by 
 
 
 
 
 
Since , we have  as long as . Based on Eqs. 
(4) and (5), ϕ can be represented by 
 
 
 
Eq. (6) gives the relationship between the revenue sharing ratio and the firms' marketing efforts. 
It essentially requires that the supplier and retailer choose their marketing efforts so that the ratio 
of the retailer's marginal marketing cost to the total of marginal marketing costs is equal to the 
revenue sharing ratio. The revenue sharing ratio imposes a constraint on the supplier and the 
retailer's marketing efforts. The supplier chooses the revenue sharing ratio to maximize its profit 
subject to this constraint. The interior solution of ϕ is given by 
 
 
 
From Eq. (5), we have  Therefore,  
 
 
 
The supplier shares the revenue with the retailer to provide the retailer with incentives to exert 
marketing effort. A positive proportion of revenue is shared only when the retailer's marketing 
effort is not very costly. When C″r(y) is very high, it is too costly for the supplier to motivate the 
retailer. As a result, the supplier chooses to set ϕ=0 and keeps all the revenue. 
 
4.3 Numerical example 
 
We use a numerical example to illustrate the firms' marketing strategies in the cases without 
consumer learning. We assume that the distribution function for the base demand  
[17] and the distribution function for the random error . Let 
 . The retailer cost is 
assumed to be much smaller than the supplier's cost to ensure that the supplier will share a 
positive proportion of revenue with the retailer. These specifications will be used throughout the 
paper. We first consider the case with symmetric information. Based on the results in Section 
4.1, we have . We then consider the case with asymmetric 
information. Based on the results in Section 4.2, we have 
 Comparing , we can 
conclude that the firms' marketing effort in the asymmetric case is less than those in the 
symmetric case. These results are consistent with the literature on moral hazard [6]. 
 
5. Consumer learning 
 
In this section, we examine the cases with consumer learning. We first consider the case where 
the supplier and retailer have symmetric information and then the case where there is information 
asymmetry between the supplier and the retailer. The consumers are uncertain about the true 
value of the product but they can learn the product value through prior product sales. In 
particular, at the beginning of period t, the consumers observe the historical product sales till 
period t−1 and update their beliefs on the product value. Then the consumers make their 
purchase decisions. The product sales are considered as signals of the base demand. 
 
5.1 Modeling consumer learning 
 
Let  represent the history of the product sales in the previous t – 1 
periods.  represents the consumers' expectation of θ after observing Dt – 1. Whten t=1, 
E[θ|D0]=θ0. When t>1, based on Eq. (1), the base demand can be represented by 
 
 
 
For tractability, we assume that both the base demand θ and the random error ε are normally 
distribution with distribution functions  respectively. We let  
According to normal learning theory, at the beginning of period t, the posterior distribution 
of θ conditional on the prior product sales Dt−1 is still a normal distribution with the mean 
E[θ|Dt−1] and the variance where E[θ| Dt−1] and are given by  
 
 
 
 
 
 are the consumers' expectations of the supplier and retailer's equilibrium 
marketing efforts in period t−1. Since the consumers cannot observe the marketing efforts,
, the learning process depends on the consumers expectations, . 
 represents the consumers' updated beliefs of the base demand. It is a weighted average 
of the prior belief of the base demand,  and the signal,  
determines the weights the consumers allocate to the prior belief and the signal. We refer to τt as 
the learning factor in the rest of the paper. Based on normal learning theory, the learning factor τt 
is given by 
 
 
 
where  is the variance of the consumers' belief on the base demand θ in period t−1. 
 
Lemmas 1 and 2 characterize the sequence of . All proofs are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Lemma 1. The learning factor  is decreasing in  and t, and increasing in  
 
The variance of the consumers' belief on the base demand in time period t, , decreases as t 
increases. When  The learning process is a random walk with the variance that 
declines deterministically to zero [14]. The learning factor is also decreasing in t, i.e., . 
That is, when the prior belief of the product demand is more random, the learning factor is larger. 
These suggest that when the signals are more informative, the market learns more from the 
product sales. The learning process speeds up with higher quality signals and/or more random 
prior belief. Lemma 2 characterizes an important property the learning factors. This property will 
be used to derive the firms' equilibrium strategies.  
 
Lemma 2. The sequence of  satisfies the following condition, 
 
 
 
This section analyzes the impact of consumer learning on the firms' marketing efforts and 
revenue sharing strategy. Consumer learning influences the firms' decisions because the firms' 
beliefs of the product demand depend on the consumers' beliefs. As the consumers learn more 
information and update their beliefs on the product value, the firms also update their beliefs on 
the base demand. Therefore, Eq. (7) also represents the supplier and the retailer's expectations on 
the base demand. As we will show later, the supplier and the retailer's marketing efforts in a 
period has a long-term effect because of consumer learning. 
 
Since the marketing efforts are unobservable, we use the concept of rational expectations 
equilibrium (REE) to derive the solution [14,20]. A REE of our model satisfies the following 
conditions: (1) given the consumers' expectations of the firms' marketing efforts and the prior 
product sales, the consumers update their beliefs on the product value and the firms update their 
beliefs on the base demand; (2) given the supplier's expectations of the retailer's marketing 
efforts in the previous periods, the supplier decides its effort level; (3) given the retailer's 
expectations of the supplier's efforts in the previous periods, the retailer decides its effort level; 
(4) the consumers and firms' expectations are consistent with equilibrium values. 
 
5.2 Symmetric information with consumer learning 
 
We first consider the case with symmetric information and consumer learning in this section. In 
the case with symmetric information, the firm's marketing efforts are observable and verifiable. 
The firms therefore can enforce a long-term contract on the revenue sharing ratio and marketing 
efforts. Since the revenue sharing is a long term strategic decision, it should be decided at the 
beginning of the time horizon. Consumer learning occurs at the beginning of each period, 
consumers learn the product value through their observations of the product sales in the previous 
periods. The supplier and retailer update their beliefs of the base demand taking account of 
consumer learning. In Section 5.2, the supplier is assumed to decide the supplier and the retailer's 
marketing efforts at the beginning of the time horizon. Alternatively, we can examine the case 
that the supplier decides the marketing efforts at the beginning of each period after it observes 
the product sale in the previous period. The solutions of these two problems are the same. We 
use the superscript ml to denote the case with symmetric information and consumer learning. We 
consider the case where the retailer and supplier interact for multiple (N≥2) periods. Recall that 
represents the history of product sales in the previous t−1 periods. The 
supplier's optimization problem can be represented as  
 
 
 
The (IR) constraint requires that the supplier will choose a ϕ to ensure the retailer's total expected 
profit is greater than zero. Since the supplier has complete information (i.e., it can observe and 
verify the retailer's efforts), it specifies the retailer's marketing efforts in the contract. The 
supplier's payment is used to cover the retailer's total cost of marketing efforts. There is no 
incentive cost in this case. We therefore have . The supplier 
determines the marketing efforts by maximizing the total profit of the supply chain. The 
supplier's optimization can be written as 
 
 
 
The marginal profit of the marketing efforts are 
 
 
 
Lemma 3 provides the relationships between the firms' marketing efforts and the market demand. 
 
Lemma 3. The relationships between the firms' marketing efforts and the market demand are as 
follows. 
 
 
 
The firms' marketing efforts in period t influence not only the market demands in period t but 
those in the future periods. The impact of the firms' marketing efforts on the market demands is 
determined by the learning factors τt(t=1…N). Lemma 3 shows that τt is decreasing in t. This 
declining sequence implies that the marketing efforts xt and yt in period t has a higher impact on 
the recent demands than on the future demands. 
 
Proposition 1 gives the firms' marketing efforts in the case with symmetric information and 
consumer learning. 
 
Proposition 1. 1. When t<N, we have 
 
 
 
2. The supplier's and retailer's marketing efforts are decreasing from the initial time period 
though time period t. 
 
3. The supplier and retailer's marketing efforts are higher than those in the case with symmetric 
information and no consumer learning. 
 
In period N, the firms' marketing efforts are the same as those in the case with symmetric 
information and no consumer learning. This is because period N is the last period and there is no 
consumer learning any more. The firms' marketing efforts in period N only influence the 
consumer demand and the supply chain's profit in this period. When t<N, Lemma 3 shows that 
the firms' marketing efforts in period t also influence the market demands thereafter, i.e., 
dt+1..dN. Eqs. (8) and (9) show that the supplier considers the aggregate impact of the marketing 
efforts on the market demands when deciding the effort levels.  
 
Proposition 1.2 and 1.3 further characterize the firms's marketing efforts in the case with 
symmetric information and consumer learning. The firms' marketing efforts in an earlier period 
impact the market demands for a longer period than those in a later period. As t increases, the 
expression has less terms. Therefore, is a decreasing function of t. Since 
Cs(.) and Cr(.) are increasing and convex functions, the firms' marketing efforts are higher in an 
earlier period than those in a later period. The firms' marketing efforts are higher than those in 
the case with symmetric information and no consumer learning, i.e.,  and , 
when t<N. Why firms have incentives to exert higher efforts in the case with consumer learning? 
This is because the consumers do not observe the firms' marketing efforts. Lemma 3 shows that 
the firms' marketing efforts have the intertemperal effects. The firms' marketing efforts not only 
directly affect the demand in the current period but also affect the firms' expectations of the base 
demand (the consumers' expectation on the true product value). In particular, the term   
represents the long-term impact of the marketing efforts on the consumers' beliefs. The supplier 
therefore has a incentive to choose higher marketing efforts to mislead the consumers. It is worth 
noting that the supplier cannot fool the consumers in the REE. The consumers rationally expect 
the firms' marketing efforts and adjust their beliefs on the base demand. The consumers take the 
firms' marketing manipulations into account when updating their beliefs. Consequently the 
supplier has to make more marketing efforts to compensate the consumers' discounts on their 
marketing efforts. The supplier demands too much marketing efforts in the case with symmetric 
information and consumer learning. The social optimal solutions of marketing efforts are given 
by 
 
 
 
Which are the same as the solutions in the case with symmetric information and no consumer 
learning. 
 
5.3. Asymmetric information with consumer learning 
 
This section considers the case where the supplier and the retailer have asymmetric information. 
At the beginning of the time horizon, the supplier decides the revenue sharing ratio, ϕ. In contrast 
to the case with symmetric information, the firms cannot contract on the marketing efforts. In 
each period, consumers learn the product value through their observations of the product sales in 
the previous periods. The supplier and retailer update their beliefs of the base demand taking 
account of consumer learning and decide their marketing efforts. Then the consumers purchase 
the products. We use the superscript al to denote the case with asymmetric information and 
consumer learning. The optimization problems of the supplier and the retailer in time period t are 
represented by 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 2 gives the firms' marketing efforts in the case with asymmetric information and 
consumer learning. 
 
Proposition 2. 
 
 
 
We find that the supplier and the retailer's marketing efforts in the period N in the case with 
asymmetric information and consumer learning are the same as those in the case with 
asymmetric information and no consumer learning. This is because period N is the last period. 
The supplier and retailer's marketing efforts have no long-term impact. The firms exert the 
marketing efforts only for their profits in period N. When t<N, a firm chooses its marketing 
effort considering not only the demand in the current period but also the demands in the periods 
thereafter. The marginal cost of the effort is proportional to the total of the learning factors from 
period t till the end of the time horizon. Proposition 3 gives important properties of the firms' 
marketing efforts. 
 
Proposition 3. 
 
1. The supplier's and retailer's marketing efforts are decreasing from the initial time period 
though time period t. 
 
2. The supplier and retailer's marketing efforts are higher than those in the case with asymmetric 
information and no consumer learning given the same revenue sharing ratio. 
 
3. The supplier and retailer's marketing efforts are less than those in the case with symmetric 
information and consumer learning. 
 
Proposition 3 shows that the firms' marketing efforts in the earlier periods impact consumer 
learning for a longer period of time, similar to the case with symmetric information and 
consumer learning. Therefore, the firms choose higher marketing efforts in the earlier periods 
than the later periods. The firms' marketing efforts are decreasing in t. 
 
Compare the firms' marketing efforts in the cases with asymmetric information, we have 
 and  given a  when t<N.1 The increase in market effort is due to the 
presence of consumer learning. Similar to Proposition 1.2 and 1.3, because of consumer learning, 
the firms have incentives to exert higher marketing efforts to mislead consumers. In a REE, the 
consumers rationally expect the firms' manipulation and adjust their belief updating. As a result, 
the firms have to increase their marketing efforts to compensate the consumers' discount. We 
also have  and  given a . This is due to the issue of double moral 
hazard. When the supplier and the retailer have asymmetric information, the supplier has to use 
revenue sharing to motivate the retailer to exert effort. Since the benefits of marketing efforts are 
split between the supplier and the retailer, both the supplier and retailer's marketing efforts are 
lower than those in the symmetric case. 
 
The supplier determines the revenue sharing ratio ϕ in the first period in consideration of its total 
profit over N period. The supplier's optimization problem is  
 
 
 
Proposition 4 gives the optimal revenue sharing ratio in the case with asymmetric information 
and consumer learning. 
 
 
Proposition 4. 
 
 
 
The term, , captures the impact of the consumer learning on the supplier's 
revenue sharing decision. From Eq. (10), we have  Therefore,  
represents a positive impact of consumer learning on ϕal. Proposition 2 shows that the supplier 
has more incentive to exert marketing effort with consumer learning. Therefore, the negative 
consequence of revenue sharing (due to moral hazard) on the supplier's marketing effort is 
alleviated. The supplier is willing to share more revenue with the retailer to motivate retailer 
exert more effort. To provide a complete picture of the impact of consumer learning on the firms' 
marketing efforts and revenue sharing strategies, Section 6 illustrates and compares the firms' 
strategies numerically. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
This section compares the firms' marketing effort, revenue sharing ratios and profits in different 
cases numerically. We use the same specifications of the numerical example used in Section 4. 
In particular, we ley  In addition, we 
assume that the supplier and retailer interact for 20 periods, i.e., N=20. 
 
Fig. 1 illustrates the supplier and retailer's marketing efforts in four cases respectively. Recall 
that mn represents the case with symmetric information and no consumer learning; ml represents 
the case with symmetric information and consumer learning; an represents the case with 
asymmetric information and no consumer learning; and al represents the case with asymmetric 
information and consumer learning. For comparison purpose, we use the same revenue ratio, 
ϕ=0.21, in the an and al cases in Fig. 1. In the mn and ml cases, the firms' efforts and profits are 
independent of ϕ. Without consumer learning (the mn and an cases), the firms' efforts are 
constant over time as the dashed lines illustrate. However, when there is consumer learning (the 
ml and al cases), both firms' marketing efforts are decreasing in t as the solid curves illustrate. 
Consumer learning motivates firms exert more effort in the earlier periods of cooperation than in 
the later periods. In the last period, the firms only consider their profits in one period. The firms' 
marketing efforts in the cases with consumer learning are equal to those in the cases without 
consumer learning. The dashed lines and solid curves meet at t=N. 
 
Firms use a revenue sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain in the cases with asymmetric 
information. The firms have less incentives to exert marketing efforts due to the issue of double 
moral hazard. The curves (or lines) for the marketing efforts in the cases with asymmetric 
information (the an and al cases) are lower than those in the corresponding cases with symmetric 
information (the mn and ml cases). Consumer learning provides a countervailing incentive and 
helps address the moral hazard issue. The firms' marketing efforts in the case with asymmetric 
information and consumer learning (the al case) may be closer to the optimal efforts (i.e., the 
efforts in the case with symmetric information and no consumer learning). Consumer learning 
effectively mitigates the adverse consequence of moral hazard. It is worth emphasizing that at 
the earlier stage of cooperation, the supplier marketing effort may be higher than the optimal 
effort level. Consumer learning may generate social loss. The firms' marketing efforts in the case 
with symmetric information and consumer learning (the ml case) manifest this negative effect of 
consumer learning. In the ml case, the firms' marketing efforts are always higher than the optimal 
effort levels (the efforts in the mn case). 
 
Fig. 2 compares the optimal revenue sharing ratios given different N in the two cases with 
asymmetric information (the an and al cases). Fig. 2 shows that the revenue sharing ratio in the 
case with consumer learning (the al case) is always higher than that in the case without consumer 
learning (the an case) given any N. This suggests that the supplier is willing to share more 
revenue with the retailer when there is consumer learning. The purpose of revenue sharing is to 
provide retailer with incentives to exert marketing effort. On the other hand, revenue sharing also 
dampens the supplier's incentive to exert effort. Consumer learning motivates the supplier to 
exert more marketing effort and mitigates the dampening effect of revenue sharing. Therefore, 
the supplier is willing to share more revenue to the retailer.  
 
Fig. 2 also shows that the revenue sharing ratio in the case with asymmetric information and 
consumer learning (the al case) is always increasing in N. This suggests that with consumer 
learning, the supplier tends to share more revenue with retailer if they cooperate for a longer 
period. This is because the effort-dampening effect of revenue sharing on the supplier side is 
weaker when N increases. As Fig. 1(a) shows, consumer learning drives the supplier to exert too 
much effort. The supplier's marketing efforts may be even higher than the optimal effort level at 
the earlier stage of cooperation. As a result, the supplier is willing to share more revenue with the 
retailer when N is larger. The supplier leverages double moral hazard to mitigate its 
overinvestment incentive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 shows the supplier's and retailer's average profits over N periods given different N in the 
case with asymmetric information and consumer learning (the al case). We calculate the 
supplier's (or retailer's) average profit by dividing the supplier's (or retailer's) total expected 
profit over N period by N. We find that the supplier's average profit is first increasing and then 
decreasing in N but the retailer's average profit is always increasing in N. When N is larger, 
consumer learning induces higher marketing efforts. This helps mitigate the loss due to double 
moral hazard. Therefore, the supplier's profit is first increasing. On the other hand, consumer 
learning may lead to too much effort on the supplier side, which negatively impacts the supplier's 
profit. This is why the supplier's profit is decreasing when N is large enough. Why is the retailer's 
profits always increasing as N increases? This is because the supplier shares more revenue with 
the retailer when N is larger, which benefits the retailer. 
 
We next examine the role of information in the supply chain with consumer learning. Fig. 4 
illustrates the average total profit of the supply chain over N periods given different N in the two 
cases with consumer learning (the ml and al cases). We calculate the average total profit of the 
supply chain by dividing total expected profit of the supply chain over N period by N. Fig. 4(a) 
shows that the average total profit of the supply chain is decreasing in N in the case with 
symmetric information and consumer learning (the ml case) but is increasing in N in the case 
with asymmetric information and consumer learning (the al case). When the firms cooperate for 
a longer period of time, the supplier has more incentive to exert marketing efforts to manipulate 
consumer learning. As a result, the firms exert too much marketing efforts in the case of 
symmetric information (the ml case) and the social loss is larger. The average total profit of the 
supply chain is decreasing in N. When there is asymmetric information, the supplier can use the 
revenue sharing ratio to control the levels of marketing efforts. Therefore, the average total profit 
of the supply chain is higher when N increases (the al case). It is worth noting that the average 
total profit in the case with asymmetric information and consumer learning (the al case) will 
eventually dropping as N is getting too large and the effort-enhancing effect of consumer 
learning is too strong. Fig. 4(b) shows that the average total profit in the al case starts decreasing 
when N>28. 
 
Fig. 4 shows that the average total profit in the case with asymmetric information (the al case) is 
higher than that in the case with symmetric information (the ml case) when N>6. This finding 
implies that information asymmetry in the supply chain may be beneficial in presence of 
consumer learning. When consumers can rationally expect the firms' behaviors, they always 
discount their observations when making inferences about the product value. Firms have no 
choice but exert more marketing efforts. Firms' manipulative efforts are in vain except burning 
money. This yields a situation of the “rat race”. Double moral hazard can be leveraged to control 
firms' incentive of misleading the market and create a better market environment. 
 
We also examine the robustness of our results. Recall that consumer learning is more effective 
given larger consumer learning factors  Lemma 1 suggests that is increasing in the variance 
of the base demand  and decreasing in the variance of the market volatility  We can use 
the learning factor to represent the impact of both variances. Figs. 5 through 8 show the firms' 
marketing efforts, the revenue sharing ratios, the firms' average profits, and the average total 
profits of the supply chain respectively given a sequence of learning factors with 
 (depicted with solid lines) and a sequence of learning factor with 
 (shown with dashed lines). We find that the curves follow the same patterns 
as we discussed before. 
 
When the learning factor is higher, the firms' marketing efforts are larger and the revenue sharing 
factor is larger. Larger learning factors have mixed impacts on the supplier's profit. When N is 
small, consumer learning is desirable, the supplier's profit is higher with larger learning factors. 
However, when N is large, consumer learning is so strong that the supplier's profit drops earlier 
given larger learning factors. This is consistent with our discussion about the negative effect of 
consumer learning. The retailer's profit is always higher with larger learning factors. Higher 
learning factors also lead to a higher average total profit of the supply chain when N is small but 
a lower average total profit when N is large in the case with asymmetric information and 
consumer learning (the al case). This is because the consumer learning process speeds up when 
the learning factors are higher. The negative impact of consumer learning also manifests earlier. 
As Fig. 8(b) shows, the average total profit drops earlier when learning factors are larger. In 
particular, the average total profit starts decreasing at N=28 whenτ2=0.615 compared to N=18 
when τ2=0.9. 
 
 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This paper considers a supply chain with a supplier and a retailer selling to consumers who 
cannot predict the value of the product with certainty. The consumers learn more about the 
product and better estimate the product value over time. The supplier and retailer can exert 
marketing efforts to improve the product sales. We develop a multi-period game-theoretical 
model to study the impact of consumer learning on the firms' marketing strategies and profits in 
the supply chain and use the REE concept to analyze the model. 
 
We find that the firms exert more marketing efforts when there is consumer learning than when 
there is no consumer learning. This is because the firms' marketing effort can not only improve 
the market demand in the current period but the consumers' belief of the product value in the 
future periods. The firms' marketing efforts is decreasing over periods. The firms exert more 
effort in the early periods to boost the brand image and increase the future revenue. Over time, 
the true value of the product is gradually revealed and the equilibrium marketing effort levels 
drop. 
 
We also find that information asymmetry is beneficial in the supply chain with valuation 
uncertainty and consumer learning. The supply chain makes a higher total profit when there is 
information asymmetry between the supplier and retailer. This result complements to the 
literature on strategic consumers. For example, Su and Zhang find that a decentralized supply 
chain yields a higher profit than a centralized supply chain when the consumers decide on the 
purchase timing [22]. In our paper, consumer learning induces both the supplier and the retailer 
to exert higher marketing efforts, which mitigates the adverse consequences of double moral 
hazard. 
 
This research can be extended in several directions. First, we considered only a single retailer (or 
retail market), whereas in practice, a new product may be carried by multiple retailers. For 
example, fashion apparel comes into the consumer's eyeshot in several market areas. A 
consumer's belief and behavior are often influenced by the activities in other markets. The 
impact of consumer learning on the dynamics between multiple retail markets in the supply chain 
should be investigated. Second, this paper assumes the market demand can always be fulfilled. In 
supply chains, supply and demand often mismatch because of long production and shipping lead 
time. It would be interesting to examine the impact of product availability on the firm's 
marketing and other operational strategies in a supply chain with consumer learning. Third, firms 
often face the challenges of properly pricing a new product in presence of valuation uncertainty. 
Future research can examine the firms' pricing decisions in the product life cycle when there is 
consumer learning. 
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Appendix A. Proof 
 
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1 
 
 
 
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2 
 
According to normal learning theory, the sequence variances are given by 
 
 
 
With Eq. (A.1) above, we have 
 
 
 
Rewrite the above equation, we have 
 
 
 
When t=2..N, we have τt+1<τt. 
 
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3 
 
The expected market demand for period t, dt, can be represented by 
 
 
 
We have 
 
 
 
Therefore 
 
 
 
The first-order derivatives of dt, dt+1 and dt+3 with respect to xt are  
 
 
 
Similarly, we can derive  as  
 
Based on Lemma 2, , we have  
 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
Since , we have 
 
 
 
That is 
 
 
 
With the same logic, we derive the relationships of the market demand 
dt and yt accordingly. 
 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
1. In the period t(1<t<N), The supplier's optimization problem in period t is represented by 
 
 
 
Differentiate with respect to xt, we have 
 
 
 
Based on Lemma 3, we have 
 
 
 
We therefore have 
 
 
 
Similarly, base on the first order condition of respect to yt, we have 
 
 
 
The retailer's effort is given by 
 
 
 
2. From Eq. (A.2), the supplier's effort is decided by p and τt. Since p>0,τt>0,t=2…N−1, and 
as t increase, the expression 
 
 
 
Similarly, we have  
 
3. Compare Eq. (3) with Eq. (A.2), we have and , when t<N. 
 
A.5. Proof of Proposition 2 
 
We first consider the retailer's problem in period N 
 
 
 
Based on the first order condition of with respect to  and Lemma 3, we have 
 
 
 
The supplier's optimization problem in period N can be rewritten as 
 
 
 
Based on the first order condition of with respect to  and Lemma 3, we have  
 
 
 
In the period t(1<t<N), The retailer optimization problem in period t is represented by 
 
 
 
The marginal impact of a retailer's effort is 
 
 
 
Based on Lemma 3, we have 
 
 
 
Based on the first order condition of with respect to yt, we have 
 
 
 
The retailer's effort is given by 
 
 
 
The supplier's expected profit is 
 
 
 
The marginal impact of a supplier's effort on its profit is 
 
 
 
Based on the first order condition of  with respect to xt, we have 
 
 
 
The supplier's effort is given by 
 
 
 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Form Eq. (A.5), the supplier's effort is decided by ϕ, p and τt. Since 
 we have   
 
Similarly, we have  
Given a fixed positive sharing ratio ϕ, compare Eq. (4) with Eq. (A.5), we have  . 
Similarly, we get  
Compare Eq. (8) with Eq. (A.5), we have  and   
 
A.7. Proof of Proposition 4 
 
At the beginning of the horizon, the supplier determines the revenue sharing factor ϕ. 
 
 
 
Using the first order condition with respect to ϕ, we get 
 
 
 
That is  
 
 
 
From Lemma 2, we have  
 
 
We therefore have  
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